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This  essay  will  enquire  whether  Turkey  and  Greece  could  remove  their  enduring 
controversies through confidence building measures, mediation and inter-governmental  
dialogues  which  were  introduced  in  the  post-1999  détente  period.  The  paper  will  
specifically focus on the recent nature of understanding between the two countries and  
will endeavour to answer the question of whether there is a divergence in the nature of  
recent cooperative arrangements from those which were concluded in the former periods  
of  détente  and each of  which were disrupted  by  succeeding  periods  of  either  armed 
conflict  or  cold  war.  The  paper  contends  that  the  recent  nature  of  Greek-Turkish 
relations  is  not  problem-free.  Yet,  the  new  cooperative  environment  facilitated  by  
confidence building measures and growing mutual understanding could help resolve the  
disputes and dispel reservations in the Aegean and Cyprus which have been very central  
to  national  security  considerations  of  both  Turkey  and  Greece.  From  a  security  
perspective, continuation of previous policies towards one another is counterproductive  
in the post-1999 period. Improvement of a bilateral dialogue under the EU umbrella is  
detrimental for the defence considerations of both Turkey and Greece.
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Introduction
This  essay  will  enquire  whether  Turkey  and  Greece  could  remove  their  enduring 
controversies  through  confidence  building  measures,  mediation  and  inter-governmental 
dialogues which were introduced in the post-1999 détente period. 
The  paper  will  specifically  focus  on  the  recent  nature  of  understanding  between the  two 
countries and will endeavour to answer the question of whether there is a divergence in the 
nature  of  recent  cooperative  arrangements  from  those  which  were  concluded  in  former 
periods  of  détente,  each  of  which  were  disrupted  by succeeding  periods  of  either  armed 
conflict or cold war. 
The analysis, therefore, will initially require a comprehensive description of the issues that led 
Turkey and Greece to enter the earlier periods of détente and the centrality of those issues to 
the national security interests of both countries. Thus, the question is: why was it that Turkey 
and Greece could not cooperate in the periods prior to the latest rapprochement? The second 
part of the analysis will elaborate on the factors that facilitated the recent détente and further 
* Eda Kuşku is a doctoral candidate at the Sabancı University, İstanbul, Turkey. She specializes in International  
Relations and Comparative Politics with a specific focus on the European Union and its relations with Turkey.
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reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. The paper will evaluate the impact of new areas of 
security cooperation as reflections of changing international dynamics, transformations in the 
impacts of the European Union (EU), changing attitudes of the publics in Greece and Turkey 
and the political leaders and the interconnection between all these factors.
The ultimate aim will be to assess the correlation between the above mentioned dimensions of 
the relationship and the national security interests of Greece and Turkey. The related question 
is whether the recent cooperative environment that was facilitated by the above factors would 
help  resolve  the  disputes  and dispel  reservations  in  the  Aegean and Cyprus,  which  have 
always been central to national security considerations of Greece and Turkey? 
Historical Baggage: Former Controversies and Détente Phases
In the history of their  dyadic  relationship,  Turkey and Greece went  through a number  of 
events which made cooperation between the two neighbours fragile and unpromising. Given 
the shadow of many unresolved past  disputes,  some observers  of Greek-Turkish relations 
have reservations  about  the prospects  for  a  continuous and encouraging  relationship  even 
under the present accommodating state of affairs. 
Going back to their processes of state formation, the record of Turkish-Greek history is full of 
inconsistencies  which  originate  primarily  from  the  issue  of  the  Greek  independence 
movement,  as  Greeks  were  the  most  resentful  for  not  being  independent  under  the  four 
centuries of Ottoman rule.  This inferior  position of Greece continued with their  defeat  in 
1919-1922 Greco-Turkish war. 
In the period of the 1930s and in the subsequent decades until the 1960s, most historians agree 
that the two countries were entering a new era in bilateral relations. Leaders of both countries, 
i.e. Atatürk and Venizelos reached compromise with the practice of ‘population exchange’ 
under the treaty of Lausanne. This mutually agreed expulsion created a malaise, especially in 
Greek domestic affairs. The relaxation of tensions between the two governments carried with 
it the side effect of creating refugee populations in both countries. Although both Greece and 
Turkey had difficulties  in  managing their  refugee problems,  they regarded the population 
exchange as one of a constructive agreement between the two governments that alleviated 
Greco-Turkish  bilateral  relations.  In  their  opinion,  it  was  a  positive  development  in  the 
process  of  state  formation,  since  the  population  exchange  helped  fortify  the  nation-state 
construction  of  Greece  and  Turkey  with  their  then  fairly  homogenized  and  stabilized 
populations.
Political, economic and security agreements, which were claimed to have been created in the 
spirit  of  this  Atatürk-Venizelos  conciliation,  were followed after  the World War II  by an 
enhanced  relationship  with  the  inclusion  of  both  Turkey  and  Greece  under  the  ‘western 
alliance  system’.  They  both  became  members  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO) to cooperate against  the common Soviet threat.  In order to reinforce the western 
security and defence structure,  this Greco-Turkish cooperation was encouraged by the US 
government which had immense leverage over both countries during the early years of the 
Cold War. Thus, Greece and Turkey were both critical actors in the containment of the Soviet 
Union  which  was  the  overriding  security  concern  for  the  US  in  the  emerging  bipolar 
2
Caucasian Review of International Affairs
Vol. 2 (3) – Summer 2008
© CRIA 2008; All rights reserved
international system.1 As part of this containment strategy of the US, Turkey and Greece were 
also the recipients of aid under the Marshall Plan.2 Hence, the first half of the 1950s was a 
continuation  of cooperative arrangements  under the military establishment  of NATO. The 
existence  of  past  rivalry  could  not  impede  the  emergence  of  an  understanding  at  the 
international level, given the fact that taking the side of the US in the bipolar international 
balance-of-power  structure  was  to  the  benefit  of  both  Turkey  and  Greece.  Hence,  the 
convergence  of  interests  under  the  NATO alliance  inaugurated  easy-going  Greco-Turkish 
relations. Unfortunately, new confrontations began to emerge during the 1960s and 1970s and 
the security consensus of the early post-war period began to erode.3 Thus being satellites of 
the US couldn’t prevent Turkey and Greece from starting to diverge from one another once 
they were pulled into long-lasting controversies in Cyprus and in the Aegean. 
A series of events leading to a stalemate in Greco-Turkish relations started as early as 1960, 
when Cyprus was granted independent status according to an agreement signed between the 
guarantor powers of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Difficulties in reconciling the dispute 
between the ethnic communities of Turks and Greeks in the island began to increase as the 
Cyprus crisis was exacerbated during the 1963-1967 outbreaks of intercommunal violence. 
The following decade was marked by a number of incidents that added to the intensification 
of the conflict. Turkish Armed Forces intervened in 1974 and occupied one third of Cyprus, 
which resulted in the fait accompli partitioning of the island. Since then there have been many 
attempts by the UN (United Nations) and recently by the EU to initiate the process of settling 
the conflict between the two communities of the island. Despite these efforts, the thirty-five 
years  of unresolved conflict  reached a deadlock that gave rise to pessimism among many 
analysts,  and  undid  their  hopes  about  the  success  of  confidence  building  measures  in 
redirecting the present day affairs between Greece and Turkey. Details of the Cyprus dispute 
are beyond the scope of this paper. The importance of the Cyprus conflict for the purpose of 
this essay is the way in which the crisis in the island has transformed foreign policy making in 
Greece  and  Turkey.  The  ongoing  impasse  resulted  in  unilateral  and  nationalistic  foreign 
policy making in both countries.
During the same period when the Cyprus  crisis was growing violent,  Turkey undertook a 
number  of  unilateral  actions  to  revise  the  international  legal  status  of  the  Aegean.  In 
1973-1974 Turkey took up the  matters  of  Continental  Shelf  (CS),  the  Flight  Information 
Region (FIR), and the incompatibility between the 10-mile limit of Greece’s air space with 
the 6-mile limit of its territorial waters.4 In 1987, tensions further escalated after  Turkey’s 
attempt to conduct underwater research on the Greek Continental Shelf in the Aegean.
As soon as Turkey and Greece began to define themselves within the western state system, in 
all of their disputes both sides began to expect the support of the West, particularly that of the 
US.5 Later,  escalating  tensions  between  Turkey  and  Greece  undermined  their  preceding 
security consensus and complicated the relations of both countries with NATO and with the 
US. It is fair to argue that the nature of the alliance between Turkey and Greece and the great 
powers  is  also  critical  in  understanding  the  way  in  which  their  dyadic  relationship  has 
1 Koliopoulos, John S, Veremis, Thanos, “Greece, the Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present”, London, 
2004, pp. 302-303.
2 Koliopoulos, John S, Veremis, Thanos 2004, pp. 302-303.
3 Aydın, Mustafa, “Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities”, in Mustafa Aydın 
and Kostas Ifantis (eds) “Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean”, London, 2004, p. 25
4 Koliopoulos, John S, Veremis, Thanos 2004, p. 320.
5 Aydın, Mustafa, Ifantis, Kostas 2004, p. 26.
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evolved. The nature of the bilateral relationship between Greece and the US has significantly 
transformed  as  US  dominance  has  begun  to  diminish,  and  especially  after  Greece’s  EU 
membership in 1981. 
Greece first applied for membership to the European Community (EC) in 1959, and Turkey 
reciprocated immediately. Yet, the military takeover in Greece between the years 1967 and 
1974 and the series of events that followed Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 crippled 
the EC-Turkey and EC-Greece dialogue. In the following period Konstantinos Karamanlis, 
who was then the Greek Prime Minister, began to execute the so called ‘shuttle diplomacy’ 
and  reapplied  in  1975  for  EC  membership  knowing  that  the  newly  established  Greek 
democracy  was  very  fragile  and  in  need  of  the  EC  anchor.  Conversely,  Turkish  Prime 
Minister  Bülent  Ecevit  chose to  move away from the EC to get  his  interests  recognized. 
Interplay of a number of other factors such as the civil war in Turkey, economic nationalism 
and EC opposition of the National Front6 made Turkey further deviate from the path to EC 
membership.
In the aftermath of its accession to the EU, Greek foreign policy gradually moved away from 
reliance on America and became oriented towards Europe. Turkish foreign policy remained 
linked to the US throughout the Cold War years, and the US continued to be the key strategic 
partner  for  Turkey in  the  following  period.  Thus,  different  orientations  in  foreign  policy 
making,  founded on the attachment  of Greece and Turkey to great powers, would in part 
explain why Turkey and Greece were further moving away from one another towards the end 
of  the  Cold  War.  Mustafa  Aydın  argues  that  the  foreign  policies  of  Turkey  and  Greece 
continue  to  be  shaped  mostly  by  western  patronage  and  influence,  with  the  purpose  of 
maintaining a position within the western state system.7 The Cold War legacy was detrimental 
in the formulation of bilateral  foreign policy for Greece and Turkey.  Some argue that the 
escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey after a series of events during the end of 
Cold  War  have  led  to  the  re-emergence  of  earlier  distrust.  In  particular,  Greece’s  threat 
perceptions were transformed with the declining threat of communism and growing assistance 
of the European institutions. Greece began to concentrate on the threats to its national security 
coming from Turkey,  although Turkey continuously declared to have no claims beyond its 
‘Misak-ı Milli’ borders.
Some analysts of Greco-Turkish relations argue that transformations in the internal dynamics 
also had considerable impact on the formulation of the foreign policies of Greece and Turkey 
towards one another. Greece started to practice democracy under civilian rule in 1974. Its 
membership to the EC in 1981 facilitated consolidation of the democratic government. In the 
Turkish case,  there  were  several  military interruptions  during  the Cold  War years.  These 
interruptions  have  created  setbacks  in  Turkey’s  accession  negotiations  with  the  EC  and 
consequently had negative  implications  for its  democratic  consolidation.  Starting with the 
1980s, Greece began to exploit its position in the EU as leverage against Turkey. Compared to 
the impact of the EU on democratic consolidation in both countries, this strategy of utilizing 
EU membership in the conduct of foreign policy towards Turkey has been more decisive in 
altering Greece’s inferior position in bilateral relations.  
6 “National Front” was the name of the coalition government established by the leader of Justice Party Süleyman 
Demirel.
7 Aydın, Mustafa, Ifantis, Kostas (2004), p. 26.
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After the 1987 dispute over the Aegean continental shelf delimitations, the two sides tried to 
solve the disagreement through confidence building measures with the process initiated by the 
meeting of Prime Ministers Papandreou and Özal in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1988.8 A 
new détente phase was entered with this  modus vivendi. Détente was momentary, given the 
reluctance of the successive Turkish and Greek governments to improve the Özal-Papandreou 
programme which was calling for developing relations in low-key politics. As Greek threat 
perceptions were transforming, similarly the way Turkey perceived its western neighbour has 
evolved through a growing confidence in Turkish military potency. Greece, on the other hand, 
was gradually becoming a soft power, largely due to its EU membership. The presence of 
NATO took care of the Hobbesian tendency of world politics  in  Europe and enabled  the 
European  states  to  focus  more  on  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  integration.9 
Turkey, however, continued to improve its military capabilities with regard to threats to its 
security from the terrorist networks in the eastern regions and other threats coming from its 
troubled eastern and southern neighbourhoods.  Hence,  an asymmetry  in  terms of military 
power became increasingly visible, which further escalated the Greek perception of Turkey as 
threat to its national security.  Furthermore,  issues in the Aegean remained unresolved and 
confidence  building  measures  initiated  after  the  1988  process  seemed  futile,  as  the 
Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996 demonstrated. The crisis brought Greece and Turkey to the brink 
of a war and tensions were reduced only after the phone calls by the US president and after 
the involvement of the general secretary of the NATO. All of these events demonstrate the 
fragility of the détente processes prior to 1999. 
Is There a Break with the Past? Factors that Facilitate Recent Détente
Ups and downs in their bilateral relations make it obvious that it would be hard to break the 
deep-rooted conflictual cycle of interaction between Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, some 
analysts  argue  that  the post-1999 period  seems to  be  distinct  from the  former  periods  of 
détente,  on account of factors that recently facilitated an engagement between Greece and 
Turkey. Although most issues remain unresolved and without settlement, the process of the 
latest détente began to evolve into what we can call a rapprochement. However, the potential 
for the continuation of the recent engagement strategy of both Greece and Turkey towards one 
another in creating a lasting peace is fundamentally linked to their national security concerns. 
The critical question is whether the recent cooperative arrangements are more important to 
national security interests of Turkey and Greece than the continuation of the  status quo in 
existing disputes that would best serve their interests.
Before all else one has to analyse the factors that have contributed to a fundamental change in 
Greco-Turkish relations in the aftermath of 1999 and which relatively sedated the burden of 
the past. Ahmet Evin argues that among many factors precipitating the latest rapprochement, 
some analysts mistakenly set too high a value on mutual sympathy that emerged on both sides 
after  the earthquakes  in Greece and Turkey.10 Since the Imia/Kardak crisis  Greek-Turkish 
relations gradually deteriorated and the worsening of relations reached a culmination point 
when it came to light that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) leader Abdullah Öcalan was 
8 Koliopoulos, John S, Veremis, Thanos (2004), p. 321.
9 Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, “The European Union and its Common Defense and Security Policy”, Yannis A 
Stivachtis (eds.), in State of the European Union, London, Ashgate press (2007), p. 4
10 Evin, Ahmet, “The Future of Greek-Turkish Relations, in: Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, vol. 5: 
3, (2005), p. 396.
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hiding  in  the  Greek  Embassy  in  Kenya.11 PKK  terrorism  has  been  one  of  the  main 
determinants  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  it  constitutes  the  central  threat  to  Turkey’s 
security.  Hence,  the  capture  of  the  leader  of  this  terrorist  organization  had  interesting 
repercussions, in terms of revolutionizing the foreign policy making of both countries towards 
one another. The capture of Öcalan was a critical achievement for Turkey and it was, on the 
other hand, a shame for Greece. Three ministers resigned from the Greek cabinet and George 
Papandreou became the new foreign minister.
Changes in the Attitudes of the Political Leaders 
In  order  to  circumvent  the  emotional  upset  of  the  Öcalan  crisis  and  its  repercussions  on 
mutual trust, the foreign minister of Turkey İsmail Cem  sent a letter to Papandreou in May 
1999 in which he outlined his views about improving bilateral relations and stated Turkey’s 
stance towards terrorist  organizations.  He argued that Turkey and Greece should reach an 
agreement on how to combat  terrorism,  and he suggested that the settlement  of this issue 
would help both sides to approach existing disputes with more trust.12 Such an approach was 
echoed positively in Greece. Papandreou responded that Greece was gratified about Turkey’s 
adherence  to  improvement  of  bilateral  relations  and  that  Greece  was  equally  sincere  in 
achieving results, and in this regard the two neighbours would cooperate on issues of culture, 
tourism, environment, crime, economy and ecological problems.13 Agreements in such issues 
of  low-key  politics  are  instrumental  in  increasing  the  soft  power  of  both  sides,  and  in 
augmenting economic prosperity in Greece and Turkey. Cooperative arrangements in low-key 
politics issues were also expected to diminish the mutual threat perception.
It is more advantageous for both sides to have stable and friendly neighbours than to exclude 
and contain the ‘other’. Thus, the current availability of new options in the conduct of foreign 
policy – that is, the pursuit of confidence building measures - thanks to the efforts by foreign 
ministers of both sides has helped to transform the other’s ‘enemy identity’ and would create 
longstanding attitudinal change. The fundamental implication of this change was that neither 
Greece nor Turkey considers any more that cooperation with the other side is the same as 
granting concessions on non-negotiable issues. 
This  attitudinal  change  also  demonstrated  itself  in  the  flourishing  personal  relationship 
between the recent prime ministers of Greece and Turkey. Political dialogue between Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and Kostas Karamanlis was positive from the start of their terms in office; 
especially  on account  of  the positive  environment  created  by Greek support  for  Turkey's 
campaign to start its EU accession negotiations at the Helsinki summit of 1999. Greek and 
Turkish diplomats also hold regular sessions in Athens and Ankara on a range of long-running 
disputes over sovereignty in the Aegean.14 However, on old thorny issues it is unrealistic to 
expect any revolutionary progress. Nevertheless, the EU membership prospects of Turkey, 
and Greece’s changing position due to its integration in the EU, may provide a framework for 
settlement  of  some  disputes  over  the  Aegean  -  such  as  territorial  waters  -  and  would 
11 Ibid
12 Aksu, Fuat, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Güvenlik ve Güven Arttırma Çabaları”, in Cem Karadeli (eds) “Soğuk 
Savaş Sonrasında Avrupa ve Türkiye”, pp. 242-275. Ankara: Ayraç Yayınları (2003) 
13 Ibid
14 “Mr Erdoğan's Greek Friend”, in: Economist, vol. 372: 8388, (2004), p. 4.
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encourage a step by step engagement and would lead eventually to opening to discussion of 
the old issues of contention.
Transformations in the impacts of the EU 
As  part  of  their  national  security  interest  and  as  a  reflection  of  strategic  foreign  policy 
making, both Greece and Turkey have been committed to remain under the Western umbrella. 
However,  as  Bahar  Rumelili  argues,  the  EU failed  to  produce  positive  effect  on  Greek-
Turkish relations until 1999.15 Although both Turkey and Greece were part of the Western 
alliance from the 1950s onwards, the EU was inadequate in providing a framework for the 
two neighbours to reconcile their disputes. It was rather the individual efforts of Greece and 
Turkey to prevent the other side from complicating the relationship with the EU. One example 
of this was the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Summit in Davos which led to a short 
period of détente between Greece and Turkey after 1988. Rumelili argues that this pursuit of 
Turkey to engage in dialogue with Greece and subsequent improvement in bilateral relations 
was  necessary  to  prevent  the  Greek  veto  on Turkey’s  application  for  membership  in  the 
European  Community  (EC).16 However,  such  initiatives  prior  to  1999  were  limited  in 
achieving lasting results and were only temporary tactical moves.
Recently, Greece has endeavoured to catch up with EU integration and Turkey is seeking EU 
membership, and making very strong efforts to conclude its accession negotiations. The EU 
has stated that it  will not grant any membership to countries who have unresolved border 
disputes.  Hence,  Turkey is  truly sensitive  about  the  fact  that  its  road to  EU membership 
depends on resolution of its disputes with Greece and with the Republic of Cyprus, which 
became a member of  the EU in 2004. Europeanization of their foreign policies, and long term 
strategic  commitment  to  the EU, are  among the fundamental  changes  that  have impacted 
Greco-Turkish relations in the aftermath of 1999. With the lifting of its longstanding veto on 
granting Turkey candidate status in the Helsinki summit of December 1999, Greece showed 
an  essential  break  with  its  past  foreign  policy  making  towards  Turkey.  “…The  Helsinki 
council decisions have also established the peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes 
as a community principle and urged the candidate states ‘to make every effort’ to resolve any 
outstanding disputes, and if  these efforts fail,  to bring the dispute before the International 
Court of Justice.”17 As Ahmet Evin observes, a stable Turkey totally absorbed in Europe also 
became part of Greece’s long-term strategic objectives.18 
Thus,  Greece’s  support  of  Turkey’s  EU membership  and its  modernization  efforts  stems 
mainly  from the  new  articulation  of  Greece’s  national  security  interest  in  line  with  EU 
objectives  - that is, to enhance democratization in its neighbourhood and stabilization in a 
wider regional level. Its further integration into the EU made Greece more oriented towards 
becoming a ‘soft security power’, through achievements in the areas of economy and low-key 
political areas such as culture. Hence, a policy of engagement began to supersede the policy 
of deterrence towards Turkey. Despite Greece’s future target of incorporating Turkey into the 
EU, Greek reservations about the disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus will carry on shaping 
Turkey’s recent membership negotiations with the EU. 
15 Rumelili, Bahar, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict” , in: “EU Border Conflicts 
Studies”, University of Birmingham, Occasional Paper 6, (2004), p. 5.
16 Ibid, p. 7
17 Ibid, p. 9
18 Evin, Ahmet, (2005), p. 398.
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Continuing Issues of Contention 
The issue  of  the  Cyprus  dispute  between  Greece  and Turkey ranks  first  in  encumbering 
Turkey’s  negotiation process with the EU. At the Council  meeting on General  Affairs  in 
December, 2007, it was decided to suspend the opening and closure of negotiations on eight 
chapters with Turkey until Turkey fulfils its commitments towards Cyprus. Turkey was asked 
by the EU to open its harbours and ports to trade with the Greek Cypriots as part of Turkey’s 
Customs Union liabilities and obligations. Turkey rebuffed this dictate of the EU and stated 
that it would not open its harbours and ports unless the isolation of the northern Cypriots is 
lifted. With reference to the EU commitments following the Referendum on the Annan Plan 
on  April  24,  2004,  Turkey  demanded  the  EU  first  fulfil  its  responsibilities  for  the 
advancement of the economic position of the Turkish Cypriots, before demanding that Turkey 
open its harbours and ports to the Republic of Cyprus. Such incidents have led to a continuous 
war of attrition between Turkey and the EU as Turkey still pursues tactical moves in order to 
achieve its national security interests. Some speculate whether these links between the Cyprus 
problem and Turkey’s negotiation process with the EU will force Turkey to take further steps 
in the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, if it seriously wants to become a member of the union. 
Hence, it can be argued that disputes between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey 
have been Europeanized, to the disadvantage of Turkey, with the accession of Greece to the 
EU in 1981 and then the accession of the Cyprus Republic in 2004. This state of affairs makes 
Greek-Turkish understanding harder to maintain. Unless a new system that will guarantee the 
security of Turkish Cypriots is established, withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island will 
be viewed as  a  security threat  by the Turkish Cypriots.  Yet,  reduction  of  the size of  the 
Turkish military presence in the island through new security arrangements would constitute a 
win-win situation  for  all  the  parties  involved.  The  nature  of  the recent  dialogue  between 
Karamanlis and Erdoğan gives the impression that they will not let Cyprus cast a shadow over 
the further promotion and pursuance of measures that facilitate the rapprochement. 
Do the domestic publics play any role?
Many  observers  are  indecisive  about  the  effects  of  changing  dynamics  in  the  domestic 
environments of Greece and Turkey, that is to say the effects of changing public demands on 
the long term commitment of governments to the process of rapprochement. If the measures 
taken by the two sides to deepen rapprochement are instrumental in the achievement of long-
standing foreign policy objectives, then it would be unthinkable that Greece and Turkey will 
resort to their previous foreign policies of deterrence. Nevertheless, the bellicosity of public 
opinion has been increased significantly with the habit of emotional responses in the instances 
of past disputes. Some argue that as the easily broken détente such as the ‘Davos process’ 
suggests, many initiatives to start a dialogue between Turkey and Greece were abandoned 
because of the lack of public support. I argue instead that it was not the volatile public opinion 
on both sides which brought the détente processes to a halt, but rather the non-existence of 
foreign policy objectives  that  would help maintain  friendly relations  between Greece and 
Turkey. Thus, the post-1999 redefinition of security interests on both sides evidently leaves 
no room for concerns about the influence of public opinion on the exacerbation of disputes. 
As previously discussed in this paper, some observers erroneously argued that the earthquakes 
changed the public opinions in Greece and Turkey and created an aura of compassion for the 
populace of the other side of the Aegean. This paper argues that,  rather than the ‘seismic 
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diplomacy’, it was the emergence of clear security interests that led both sides to realize the 
importance of achieving deepened cooperation in the post-1999 period.
Redefinition of security interests
Recently, Greece has a clear interest in the progress of its integration into the EU, and Turkey 
is looking for membership in the Union. Hence, as noted above, the disputes between Greece 
and  Turkey  gradually  became  Europeanized.  The  EU  impact  on  Greco-Turkish  bilateral 
relations, details of which have already been discussed, stands as the most central aspect of 
both sides’ security considerations and will observably continue to determine the future of 
Greco-Turkish relations.  The formation of common identities under the EU umbrella,  and 
more importantly the effects of this development on the convergence of the foreign policy 
interests of Greece and Turkey, are positive for the continuation of recent rapprochement.
Turkey historically has numerous geopolitical concerns, whereas Greece has conventionally 
been preoccupied with its  relations  with Turkey.19 Since both Turkey and Greece became 
embedded in  the EU, their  strategic  interests  began to  converge.  However,  as Ian Lesser 
argues, traditional issues of bilateral conflict may rise all over again if Turkish-EU relations 
collapse.20  Conventional politics will continue to constitute the main determinant of the future 
bilateral  dialogue  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  Yet,  opening  of  new  channels  of 
communication, especially through economic cooperation, would prevent any comprehensive 
deterioration  of  bilateral  relations.  Especially  after  1999,  positive  effects  of  confidence-
building measures began to be felt and were expanded through a set of initiatives. Foreign 
ministers  Dora  Bakoyannis  and  Abdullah  Gül  agreed  on  specific  measures  for  further 
strengthening  of  relations  in  June,  2006.21 They  agreed  that  cooperation  should  continue 
between the two countries in the energy, economic and banking sectors. Abdullah Gül, later 
the Turkish President, has routinely said that "The glass of water in Greek-Turkish relations is 
more than half full and we will try to fill it."22
More importantly, Greece and Turkey recently began to engage in high level military contacts 
as  part  of  new confidence-building  measures.  As part  of  this  initiative,  Dora  Bakoyannis 
stated that the armed forces of the two neighbours will expand military visits, conduct joint 
missions  in  NATO-disaster  assistance  efforts  and  overseas  peacekeeping  duties.23 This 
military  exchange  and  cooperation  is  an  essential  component  of  both  countries’  national 
security  interests.  Such  developments  are  helpful  in  incrementally  furthering  the 
rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. 
Greek-Turkish ties were also bolstered  when in October, 2007 leaders of the two countries 
opened a pipeline project that will carry natural gas from Central Asia to western Europe, 
connecting  Azerbaijan  and  Italy  by  2012.24 The  pipeline  project  also  serves  the  security 
19 Lesser, Ian O., “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment”, in: Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea 
Studies, vol. 5: 3, (2005), p. 349.
20 Ibid, p. 350
21 “Greek, Turkish FMs Discuss Confidence Building Measures”,  source: Athens News Agency, accessible 
through the Official Website of  Embassy of Greece in Washington, DC (2006) 
22 “Greek, Turkish FMs Discuss Confidence Building Measures”, (2006), source: Athens News Agency, 
accessible through the Official Website of  Embassy of Greece in Washington, DC 
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interests of both countries, and once initiated it will become harder for Turkey and Greece to 
step back from this area of cooperation. 
A 50 % increase in trade volume between Greece and Turkey in 2007 is a clear indicator of 
the strengthening of bilateral relations on economic issues.25 The recent foreign minister of 
Turkey Ali Babacan has stated that "In certain sectors such as energy and banking, Greece has 
become our No. 1 partner."26 
Conclusions: Is Lasting Peace Possible?
The recent nature of the bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey is different from 
the  previous  state  of  affairs  on  account  of  a  multiplicity  of  factors.  Orientation  towards 
cooperation, and the gradual abolition of strategic competition in a number of areas, suggests 
that  the  security  interests  of  Greece  and  Turkey  are  converging.  The  realist  theory  of 
international relations assumes that as rational strategic actors Turkey and Greece consider 
their foreign policy alternatives and choose among these alternatives after evaluation of each 
of their options in a cost-benefit analysis. According to realism, Turkey or Greece would not 
follow any policy that would minimize their strategic interests. Common policies in an ever 
expanding issue agenda are adopted since all of these issues serve the security interests of 
both  Turkey  and  Greece.  Every  successful  step  in  these  issues  of  low-key  politics  and 
flourishing economic cooperation contribute to cooperation in issues of high-level politics, as 
the enhancing high level military contacts have shown.  During his visit to Selanik for the 
meeting of Balkan countries’ Chiefs of Armed Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt,  Chief of Turkish 
Armed Forces, stated that "No one would presume that the countries who fight one another 
will finally establish the EU. Some day we will also overcome these problems."27 
Yet, Turkey has broader national security considerations about the issues of Cyprus and the 
Aegean. These unresolved conflicts have the potential to lead to a deterioration of relations 
and continue  to  pose threats  to  the continuation  of  engagement  strategies  by Turkey and 
Greece. Stalemate in the Cyprus dispute also negatively impacts Turkey’s EU membership 
negotiations.  Any  frustration  in  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  EU  would  not  have  direct 
implications  on  Greco-Turkish  relations,  but  would  lead  to  redefinition  of  the  strategic 
interests and strategies of Turkey and hence would weaken Turkey’s orientation towards a 
rapprochement with Greece. 
25“Yunanistan ve Türkiye Askeri Bağları Arttıracak”, (2007), accessible through the official website of Stratejik 
Boyut 
26 Ibid 
27 Şık, Barkın, “Türk Yunan İlişkisine AB’yi Örnek Gösterdi”, (2007), accessible through
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/20/siyaset/axsiy02.html 
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